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How Commonsense Consumption Acts Are Preventing 
“Big Food” Litigation 
Grace Thompson 
INTRODUCTION 
America needs a health transformation. The data and statistics seem 
irreversible and continue to accelerate in the wrong direction. Obesity 
plagues 36.5% of adults in the U.S. and 17% of the youth.1 Obesity in 
children has more than tripled over the last thirty years.2 An even larger 
proportion of Americans—around 64.5%—are considered overweight 
based on a Body Mass Index calculation.3 The United States Surgeon 
General predicted this weight epidemic back in 2003.4 He went so far as 
declaring terrorism less of a threat to our health than the obesity epidemic.5 
Indeed, it is undeniable that serious health risks are associated with 
obesity. Obesity has been linked to high blood pressure, coronary heart 
disease, several cancers, type 2 diabetes, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, low 
quality of life, and even mental illnesses such as clinical depression and 
anxiety.6 
The problem goes beyond health; it affects many aspects of our 
economy as well. Approximately $147–210 billion per year is spent on 
medical costs related to adult obesity alone (increased from the $93 billion 
estimated in 2003).7 Health care costs comprise approximately 9.1% of 
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our total national costs, paid for primarily by the government programs 
Medicaid and Medicare.8 Moreover, Americans suffering from diseases 
and other health concerns are more likely to miss work and eventually 
decrease contributions to commerce—especially those with physically 
demanding jobs. 
One thing is certain: something must change in order to start moving 
the statistics in the right direction. While the increasing scale of obesity 
and other diet-related health issues in the U.S. demands reform, the legal 
avenues for reform are slim. Among these legal impediments, and 
arguably presenting the most challenging to health reform progress, are 
Commonsense Consumption Acts (CCAs). Twenty-four states have 
enacted various forms of CCAs.9 In large part, these laws prohibit 
individuals from seeking civil liability for injury or death when the liability 
is based on the individual’s health condition related to weight gain or 
obesity, or from the individual’s long-term, excessive consumption of 
food.10 CCAs aim to protect food corporations, manufacturers, sellers, 
trade associations, livestock producers, and retailers of food products from 
liability related to consumer lawsuits.11 
Only two lawsuits have been filed against food corporations on the 
theory that the corporation was civilly liable for health-related conditions 
arising from the consumption of its food products. The plaintiffs lost in 
both instances. One set of plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District 
Court in the South District of New York (“Pelman”). In this suit, two obese 
teenagers attempted to sue McDonald’s fast food chain in a class action 
litigation asserting that consumption of McDonald’s food was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ obesity and related health problems.12 
The judge denied class certification on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed 
to satisfy the elements required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 
The plaintiffs attempted to file an amended complaint, but the suit was 
dismissed, this time with prejudice.14 
The second, less well-known case was filed in the United States 
District Court in the Western District of New York (“S.F.”). The plaintiffs 
claimed several producers negligently designed High Fructose Corn Syrup 
and failed to warn consumers about the presence of High Fructose Corn 
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Syrup in their products.15 The judge dismissed the case in part because the 
plaintiff failed to “connect her disease to the actions of any one 
defendant.”16 The scarcity of cases filed against food corporations on this 
theory of liability, and the dismissive results in these cases, demonstrates 
the uphill battle that tort reform has in shaping health reform. 
This Note takes a critical look at Commonsense Consumption Acts 
and how they are detrimental to the possibility of “Big Food” litigation. 
The tobacco industry was held accountable through the effective use of 
tort litigation (commonly referred to as “Big Tobacco” litigation), and the 
food industry could theoretically be held similarly accountable, but CCAs 
are preventing the possibility of similar reform. Therefore, in order for 
health reform to be as effective as tobacco reform, CCAs must be repealed 
in the states where they exist. Part I of this Note discusses why the food 
industry needs tort reform. Specifically, it argues that the food industry 
has engaged in deceitful practices that are directly harming the health of 
American consumers, just as the tobacco industry did. Class action 
lawsuits played a vital role in holding the tobacco industry liable for 
tobacco-related illnesses. If CCAs were removed, class action lawsuits 
could also make an impact on obesity-related illnesses by holding the food 
industry accountable. Part II gives an overview of the different CCAs, 
including the legislative impetus behind their enactment and how they 
prevent health reform. Part III dives into a variety of foreseeable problems 
tort reform faces when taking on the powerful food industry, including 
how litigation against the food industry would differ from the–largely 
successful litigation against the tobacco industry. Lastly, the Note 
concludes with the argument that CCAs must be repealed, in order to move 
toward a healthier, more prosperous America. 
I. WHY THE FOOD INDUSTRY WARRANTS TORT REFORM 
Before we can identify solutions to this obesity epidemic, we must 
first understand how we ended up here. Today, the food industry produces 
$1 trillion per year in gross profits.17 The Federal Government spends 
roughly $2.7 trillion per year on healthcare.18 Approximately 75% of the 
money the government spends on healthcare costs goes toward treating 
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chronic metabolic diseases, which, according to Dr. Robert Lustig, could 
be prevented if we did something about our diet.19 He reveals the 
government must spend roughly $3 for every $1 the food industry profits 
to clean up the mess the big food corporations leave in their wake.20 
Instead of focusing our time and energy on treating these diseases, perhaps 
we should take a more practical approach by shifting our focus towards 
educating the American public and transforming the type of food available 
to it.  
A. The Big Players 
The food industry is incredibly powerful, with that power 
concentrated in only a handful of high-stakes players calling the shots. 
According to a report conducted by Oxfam International, ten corporations 
“are so powerful that their policies can have a major impact on the diets 
and working conditions of people worldwide, as well as on the 
environment.”21 Most—if not all—of the ten companies are household 
names: Associated British Foods, Coca-Cola Company, Groupe Danone, 
General Mills, Kellogg Company, Mars Incorporated, Mondelez 
International, Nestle, PepsiCo, and Unilever Group.22 These companies 
control the world’s food industry. In 2013, they generated tens of billions 
of dollars of revenue, boasting at least $50 billion in assets, and employing 
over 1.5 million people.23 They also dominate advertising. In 2012, nine 
of the ten companies were among the 100 largest media spenders in the 
world.24 For example, that same year, Coca-Cola spent over $3 billion on 
advertising, making it the world’s sixth largest advertiser.25 
These companies essentially write the food advertising narrative and 
control much of the food available, yet they shirk the responsibility to push 
for a positive health transformation. This is not surprising—the change 
that is needed would negatively impact their sales, profits, and domination 
over the industry. In fact, some of these companies are actively and 
willfully contributing to the negative impact of their food products on the 
health of Americans. Take Coca-Cola, for example. In 2015, the New 
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York Times exposed Coca-Cola for sponsoring scientific studies that 
specifically aimed to shift blame away from sugary beverages and 
downplay the link between sugar and obesity.26 These health scientists 
were not only publishing studies in peer-reviewed scientific journals, they 
were also “advancing this message in medical journals, at conferences, and 
through social media.”27 As a result, their message spread, reaching the 
general public at large. 
Companies continue to push their products regardless of health 
warnings from prominent organizations. In 2009, the American Heart 
Association recommended limiting the amount of added sugars in an 
individual’s diet to “no more than half of [the individual’s] daily 
discretionary calories allowed.”28 For most American women, this equals 
roughly 6 teaspoons, 24 grams, or 100 calories.29 For men, the 
recommendation totaled approximately 9 teaspoons, 36 grams, or 150 
calories.30 Similarly, in its 2015–2016 recommendations, the Office of 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (ODPHP) pushed for a 
significant limitation in daily intake of added sugars.31 Without 
distinguishing between demographics, ODPHP recommended individuals 
limit their daily intake of added sugars to less than 10% of total caloric 
intake.32 It also recommended limiting saturated fats to less than 10% of 
caloric intake per day and sodium intake to less than 2,300 milligrams per 
day.33 The ODPHP indicated these specific substances must be limited 
because they are “of particular public health concern in the United 
States.”34 Despite these health warnings, companies continue to market, 
sell, and distribute their sugary products in mass quantities across the 
United States.  
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B. The Illusion that is “Choice” 
One of the toughest challenges facing effective tort reform in the 
food industry is that of personal autonomy—the idea that we are rational 
actors who choose when and what we consume. McDonald’s does not 
force its customers to eat fries. General Mills does not require grocery 
shoppers to purchase sugary cereal. The idea that we are free actors 
making independent, uninfluenced choices is a keystone of the American 
identity.35 However, what if “choice,” when it comes to the food we eat, is 
merely an illusion? Put differently, if food companies have been pushing 
a profit-over-people agenda for decades, then is it possible that most 
consumers lost the ability to choose what they eat and when they eat it? 
The authors of Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America argue 
that society is too willing to attribute responsibility for, and causation of, 
health problems to the personal choices of consumers.36 Before discussing 
influences that lead to obesity, the article gives an extensive overview of 
social psychology.37 It emphasizes the “fundamental attribution error,” or 
the tendency to overestimate the influence of personal dispositions and 
choice while underestimating situational behavior.38 In other words, social 
psychology research, such as Stanley Milgram’s 1963 famous shock 
study, indicate that people are heavily influenced by perception, context, 
and environment, rather than just by free will.39 This conclusion 
contradicts the assertion that human action is driven primarily by 
autonomy and choice. 
Shifting the conversation to the health epidemic in our country, the 
authors discuss multiple ways in which humans, when viewed as 
“situational actors,” do not have much of a choice when it comes to the 
food that they eat.40 First, we are bombarded with advertisements and 
convenient ways to obtain food, both of which are meant to manipulate 
our biological disposition to seek “high-energy foods” (i.e., sugar).41 
Second, we are the unwitting victims of psychological tactics employed 
by food companies that target consumers in order to get us to eat more 
food (resulting in increased profits for the vendors and a larger waistline 
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for the consumers).42 For example, many restaurant chains use overhead 
speakers to waft music inside the restaurant because it has been shown “to 
increase overall spending.”43 Moreover, fast food companies have turned 
to chemistry in order to identify the perfect flavors that will “induce [a] 
pleasurable response in consumers and sell more burgers and french 
fries.”44 Thanks to our psychological disposition toward fundamental 
attribution error—a propensity understood and purposefully exploited by 
food companies—we are prone to mindlessly engage in overconsumption 
of unhealthy products. This begs the question: do we even have a choice 
in the matter? 
Furthermore, empirical research suggests we are not truly rational 
actors.45 Many food corporations, such as Dr Pepper, Snapple Group, 
General Mills, and Kraft, have invested an exorbitant amount of money 
and resources in food science research in order to sell more product by 
taking advantage of our inability to act rationally.46 While we may not be 
cognizant of their influence over our inability to make rational decisions 
when it comes to the food we eat, these food companies have shamelessly 
exploited this inability for decades.  
Corporate influence on our food choices (or lack thereof) is most 
notable when it comes to overconsumption. Researchers Brian Wansink 
and Koert Van Ittersum discuss the problem of overconsumption, placing 
the blame primarily on portion sizes.47 They argue that “portion 
distortion”48 started in the late 1970s in restaurants and has been 
exacerbated by the popularity of fast food and, importantly, by portion 
increases in packaged foods sold in grocery stores.49 After examining 
studies that confirmed overconsumption is a problem, the authors decline 
to hold the consumer themselves responsible for bad habits.50 In fact, they 
acknowledge the difficulty of controlling overconsumption through 
willpower alone, noting, “[i]t is much easier for a person to change his or 
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her environment than to change his or her thinking.”51 While eating a 
larger portion over a smaller portion is—in theory—a “choice,” Wansink 
and Van Ittersum’s research suggests it is incredibly difficult for 
consumers to exercise routine portion control when living in a capitalist 
society that eagerly takes advantage of the revenue potential provided by 
overconsumption.52 
On top of this illusion of choice, we also like to think we are not 
susceptible to advertising, when in fact, we are. Most people tend to 
believe that advertisements on the Internet, television, billboards, or 
elsewhere do not influence their choices whatsoever.53 However, as 
evidenced by the fortunes spent by corporations to study consumer 
behavior and how we respond to advertisements, they do, in fact, influence 
our choices. Michael Moss writes in his popular book “Sugar, Fat, Salt: 
How the Food Giants Hooked Us,” that food manufactures are “well 
aware” of our addiction to sugar “along with a whole lot more about why 
we crave sweets.”54 According to Moore, companies like Kraft have 
employees who have had to “tread very carefully” in balancing their desire 
to increase sales by creating better products with the knowledge that their 
salty, sugary, and fatty foods were causing obesity.55 
Perhaps we as a society should follow food corporations’ lead in 
investing time, money, and energy in how we think about food rather than 
shaming individuals for what and how much they eat. If we can embrace 
what food corporations have known for years—that we are not rational 
actors when it comes to the food we eat because of our susceptibility to 
environment, advertising, and addictive ingredients—then maybe we can 
stop blaming poor choices of individuals for the obesity epidemic and 
other diet-related health issues and begin to shift blame to the proper party.  
II. COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACTS: PAST AND FUTURE 
The debate over whether America needs a health transformation is 
no longer a debate, as diet-related epidemics become a sad but undeniable 
reality. The question is not do we need health reform, but rather, what 
method of reform will be the most effective.56 As discussed above, the 
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food industry, as well as the general public, too easily places the blame for 
food-related health issues on the choices of individuals.57 This is a rampant 
societal issue that will not be easy to solve. Assuming, however, that 
enough Americans agree that the food industry is responsible for this dire 
health crisis, we must next determine which avenue of remedy, justice, and 
reform to pursue. 
A. Legislative History 
Before politicians and American consumers were aware of this diet-
related health epidemic, creating the need for reform, the food industry 
was already pursuing legislative measures to safeguard their goldmine.58 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) finalized the model 
CCA on January 1, 2004.59 The United States House of Representatives 
successfully passed what was commonly referred to as the “cheeseburger 
bill”60 in the same legislative year, but the bill did not pass in the Senate.61  
While the Senate rejected a federal CCA after passing in the House, 
food industry lobbyists succeeded in passing many state-level 
“cheeseburger bills.” This series of enactments started with Florida62 and 
Colorado63 in May of 2004, followed by Washington in June,64 then 
Tennessee in July,65 and Michigan in October of that same year.66 South 
Dakota67 and Arizona68 ensued shortly after. In 2005, eleven additional 
states followed suit, enacting what are now referred to as “Baby 
McBills.”69 Utah’s legislature acknowledged it had not yet embraced a law 
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limiting the liability of food providers, but ultimately justified enacting the 
CCA because “[t]he passage of the Act follows the trend of a majority of 
states in the nation that have considered this type of legislation.”70 Today, 
a total of twenty-three states have enacted some version of a CCA.71 In 
one quick sweep, the food industry used state legislatures to shield itself 
from reform.  
The Louisiana State Legislature was the only legislature that enacted 
its CCA before ALEC’s model, passing its law in June of 2003.72 The 
language of Louisiana’s law is typical of a majority of the statutes, 
providing: 
Any manufacturer, distributor, or seller of a food or nonalcoholic 
beverage intended for human consumption shall not be subject to 
civil liability for personal injury or wrongful death based on an 
individual’s consumption of food or nonalcoholic beverages in cases 
where liability is premised upon the individual’s weight gain, obesity, 
or a health condition related to weight gain or obesity and resulting 
from his long-term consumption of a food or nonalcoholic 
beverage.73 
Some states’ legislative history have been a bit more controversial. 
In Oklahoma, for example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rendered the 
original CCA void in its entirety.74 In Douglas v. Cox, the court held the 
bill violated the single-subject rule75 required by the state’s constitution.76 
Albeit a small victory, it was short-lived after the court conceded, “[w]e 
do not doubt that tort reform is an important issue for the Legislature.” 
After the opinion was issued in June of 2013, the legislature quickly 
responded by implementing a new tort protection in September of the same 
year.77 Utah and Wisconsin resisted initially, but ultimately enacted their 
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versions of a “Baby McBill” in February and March of 2008, 
respectively.78 
Notably, half of the states have not joined the trend in enacting 
CCAs.79 However, enough states have enacted CCAs to render some form 
of tort litigation moot. Unless the CCAs are significantly changed or 
repealed all together, the possibility of a tobacco-like litigation reform is 
unlikely. 
B. The Legislative Purpose Behind the Enactments 
Some state legislatures were clear as to why they were enacting 
CCAs, while others were less transparent. Among those less transparent is 
the Louisiana State Legislature, the first to enact a CCA.80 Members of the 
legislature provided nothing more than a bare legislative procedure of 
sessions in which the law was proposed, amended, and eventually 
enacted.81 Other state legislatures—such as Alaska, Arizona, and 
Georgia—were also mechanical in their enactments, following ALEC’s 
format while providing little purpose or substantive incentive behind 
passing the law.82 Likewise, an Illinois Senator introduced the bill, gave a 
brief description of how it functions, and simply mentioning that other 
states have considered similar legislation, of which six actually passed into 
law.83 The Senator wrapped up the bill’s introduction noting “[t]his is an 
initiative of the Illinois Restaurant Association. The trial Lawyers are 
neutral on it.”84 The bill passed with a sweeping fifty-eight ayes and not a 
single nay vote.85 
On the other hand, Colorado’s lawmakers testified in favor of its 
enactment, declaring it necessary to prevent alleged frivolous lawsuits.86 
The prime sponsor of the bill, Representative Dr. Lynn Hefley,87 cited 
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obesity statistics in Colorado and discussed related anecdotes about “other 
frivolous lawsuits.”88 Additionally, a representative on behalf of the 
Colorado Restaurant Association (CRA) spoke in favor of the bill.89 He 
also cited these “frivolous lawsuits” related to obesity and answered the 
members’ questions about the differences between “a one-time experience 
resulting in a valid injury” and “a pattern of unhealthy eating that is 
attributed to the individual’s choice . . . .”90 Similarly, Florida’s 
lawmakers asserted it was necessary in wake of the lawsuits filed against 
fast food corporations where plaintiff’s alleged “health-related injuries due 
to weight gain . . . .”91 However, lawmakers could only cite to Pelman to 
support this assertion.92 More significantly, the legislature explicitly 
referenced the successful tobacco litigation as a motivating factor behind 
enacting its CCA.93 
The titles of the statutes also provide insight into the purpose behind 
their enactments. Ironically, Idaho’s CCA is located in the “Health and 
Safety” section of its state legislature, with the inflammatory title: 
“Prevention of frivolous lawsuits.”94 On the other hand, South Dakota’s 
statute title is unambiguous as to its purpose and structure: “Prohibition on 
recovery based on claims of weight gain, obesity, or health condition 
resulting from long-term consumption of qualified product.”95 Likewise, 
Kansas’ reads: “Immunity from liability for claims arising out of weight 
gain or obesity.”96 In other words, the goal of these statutes is clear: to 
prevent class action lawsuits related to the excessive consumption of 
unhealthy food manufactured by “Big Food” companies.  
 
C. The Future of CCAs 
Even though there was a flurry of legislation in the early 2000s, it 
appears the Baby McBills have lost steam. Currently, nothing is pending 
in the state legislatures, which have abstained from enacting CCAs up until 
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this point.97 Furthermore, no federal legislation has been enacted (although 
it was attempted in 2005).98 It is unclear what the future holds for CCAs. 
For now, twenty-three states are blocking the potential for tort reform 
against the food industry, but this has proven to be enough to prevent the 
progression of tort litigation in this context. 
III. FORESEEABLE OBSTACLES 
While tort reform should be a viable option for reforming the food 
industry, it has foreseeable obstacles. For example, the plaintiffs in the 
potential lawsuits against “Big Food” are likely to face similar challenges 
to those faced by the plaintiffs in the “Big Tobacco” litigations. Moreover, 
defense lawyers will have the ability to be cleverer, more cunning, and 
more knowledgeable in their arguments against this “Big Food” litigation. 
A. Issues with Tort Reform in the Big Food Litigation Context 
As evidenced by the court’s ruling in Pelman, the biggest issue 
plaintiffs have in bringing a tort action (class action or otherwise) against 
the food industry is causation.99 Although obesity’s exact cause remains 
highly debated, scientists and doctors alike have suggested ways to combat 
the disease,100 which indicates that we have an idea of its cause. What we 
do know is that Americans eat at least 10% of their total caloric intake in 
added sugars (primarily found in processed foods produced in large part 
by the ten companies discussed above).101 In a study published in JAMA 
Internal Medicine, “participants who took in 25% or more of their daily 
calories as sugar were more than twice as likely to die from heart disease 
as those whose diets included less than 10% of added sugar.”102 Foods like 
cookies, cakes, pastries, fruit drinks, ice cream, frozen yogurt, and candy, 
and beverages such as sodas, energy drinks, and sports drinks account for 
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much of the overconsumption of added sugar.103 Although it is “well-
known” that the intake of added sugar is linked to weight gain,104 it will 
remain difficult to prove the legal theory that the defendant’s specific 
product was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s obesity.  
Another obstacle facing tort reform in this context is the existence of 
state consumer protection laws. Most states enacted these laws after being 
prompted by a speech by President Kennedy in 1962, entitled, “The 
Regulation of Advertising.”105 In this speech, President Kennedy intended 
to promote 1) the right to safety, 2) the right to be informed, 3) the right to 
choose among products, and 4) the right to be heard as a consumer.106 The 
purpose behind consumer protection laws is to empower consumers; 
however, the existence of these laws allows Big Food to argue that it was 
in compliance with the applicable state consumer protection laws, it did 
not abuse its advertising rights, and it did not prohibit the consumers’ right 
to choose whether or not to purchase their product. 
Finally, as discussed in Part I. B., the plaintiffs in these cases have a 
scientifically supported argument that choosing to eat food that negatively 
impacts their health is, for the most part, an illusion and not entirely the 
plaintiffs’ fault. Regardless, the defense of personal responsibility and 
autonomy will almost certainly be raised.107 Although both sides have 
seemingly persuasive arguments, it is highly possible that a court would 
find, as it did in Pelman, that “[n]obody is forced to eat at McDonalds.”108 
However, the argument is not that these cases are airtight; rather, it is that 
these plaintiffs should have their day in court. As long as CCAs are on the 
books, this is not a possibility. Just as it took time, money, and social 
acceptance to have successful tobacco litigation (discussed further in Part 
III. B.), the same would apply to Big Food litigation.109 
B. How Tort Law Reformed the Tobacco Industry 
The impetus behind the tobacco litigation was the widespread 
information in the national press about the health risks involved in 
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smoking.110 As a result of this information, lawsuits began to flourish as 
people tried to sue tobacco companies “for injuries they believed were 
caused by smoking.”111 Taking down “Big Tobacco” was no small feat. 
Forty years and 1,800 lawsuits later, lawyers and plaintiffs were finally 
awarded a victory over Big Tobacco for smoking related illness.112 
In 1954, the case Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds initiated the “first wave” of 
the tobacco litigation.113 The first wave was largely unsuccessful because 
the tobacco companies refused to settle and employed familiar delay 
tactics via discovery requests and procedural motions.114 However, a new 
doctrinal development occurred in the 1960s–70s, which enabled the 
“second wave” to be more successful.115 Namely, comparative fault 
liability breathed new life into these plaintiffs’ claims, as well as “an 
increased scientific knowledge about the health effects of cigarettes” and 
the continued public commentary of the dangers of tobacco use.116 The 
third and final wave, which began in 1994, engaged the public even further 
by emphasizing public, rather than private, goals.117 Specifically, the 
success can be attributed to the idea that “[o]nce smoking is recognized as 
an addiction that usually begins while the smoker is a minor, it can more 
readily be perceived as a public health matter, rather than a question of 
individual choice.”118 Moreover, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to 
reveal information in discovery that finally drove the tobacco defendants 
to start settling cases.119 Discovery shed new light “on the industry’s 
knowledge of the addictiveness of tobacco, as well as its intentional 
manipulation of nicotine levels and marketing to minors.”120 
C. Comparing “Big Tobacco” Litigation with “Big Food” 
Litigation 
Several parallels between the potential for Big Food litigation and 
what transpired during the Big Tobacco litigation exist. First, the litigation 
would target a pressing public health concern: obesity. Second, the 
litigation would face the same set of legal obstacles that the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in the tobacco litigation had to overcome (assumption of risk, 
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causation, individual choice, etc.). Third, similar to the deep-pocketed 
tobacco industry, the food industry, with its ten powerful members, has to 
the means to combat litigation. Finally, the products that are causing 
concern (tobacco as well as sugar, fat, and salt) are documented as highly 
addictive and cause negative impacts on the health of Americans. Because 
of these similarities, the possibility of reforming the food industry with the 
same method of mass litigation is not only possible—it was predicted as 
probable. 
In 2003, the general counsel for the American Tort Reform 
Association (ATRA), along with seasoned lawyers from both the plaintiff 
and defense side, said the years ahead hold serious tobacco-like litigation 
against the food industry.121 Not coincidentally, this prediction was 
documented one year before CCAs were enacted. Similarly, in fall of 
2003, the Washington University Law Quarterly published a Note 
predicting more lawsuits like Pelman and S.F. would be initiated for two 
reasons: “(1) there are nearly 100 million overweight people in America, 
and Big Food serves them products that contribute to their weight 
problems; and (2) caring for overweight and obese people costs 
approximately $157 billion per year, and Big Food can afford to subsidize 
these costs.”122 Unbeknownst to the lawyers, the ATRA, and the author of 
Living on the Fat of the Land: How to Have Your Burger and Sue It Too, 
the food industry also saw the writing on the wall and effectively blocked 
tobacco-like litigation by turning to the legislature and lobbying for a tort 
shield. Unfortunately, these predictions no longer had the legal avenue to 
come to fruition. 
While the type of tort reform that successfully took down the tobacco 
industry has the potential to do the same to the food industry, reforming 
the food industry using this method would face unique obstacles. For one, 
the food industry can learn from the mistakes of the tobacco industry 
before litigating against potential plaintiffs. In other words, the food 
industry can take notes about what did not work for the Big Tobacco 
defendants in order to avoid the same litigation pitfalls fighting the Big 
Food plaintiffs.  
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Moreover, eventually, smokers became somewhat like social 
pariahs. It was no longer “cool” to smoke, but rather seen as a disgusting 
and repulsive habit. Thus, what was once a status custom became a 
nemesis to society. Not only did the general public disapprove of smoking, 
but the press, politicians, and state attorneys general got involved in 
spreading the “must quit” message.123 According to Roger Parloff, author 
of the editorial piece “Is Fat the Next Tobacco?,” the public attack on 
tobacco was “very powerful,” and tort reform only works if society has 
been persuaded that the “object of attack is some kind of pariah.”124 While 
doctors, dentists, and kale–eaters may frown upon eating a cheeseburger, 
is still largely an accepted and often celebrated pastime. It certainly helps 
that eating healthily, exercising, and living a healthy lifestyle have become 
increasingly popular, but we are still far from considering soda drinkers 
societal pariahs. Unless eating unhealthily becomes as socially 
unacceptable as smoking, successful tort reform will be difficult to pursue 
without the same degree of awareness and public support. 
In order to move health reform forward, one way to distinguish the 
fight against unhealthy food from tobacco is the long list of long-term 
health affects as a result of eating junk food. The health problems 
associated with tobacco use, while also incredibly serious and 
disconsolate, are limited. On the other hand, the negative health effects of 
eating an excessive amount of sugar, fat, and sodium are virtually endless. 
Furthermore, as Parloff noted in his article, once weight is gained, it is 
“notoriously hard to lose.”125 This is especially bothersome when it comes 
to childhood obesity. For the most part, the general public is aware of the 
dire need for a health transformation. Thus, the message must be that 
change can occur by influencing the products distributed by the food 
industry. But the food industry is not going to change on its own. It must 
be pushed, like the tobacco industry, to make a substantial change that will 
benefit nearly every consumer in America. 
Eventually, the tobacco industry agreed to settle the disputes by 
paying $246 billion to the states themselves (some juries required the 
tobacco companies to pay individuals, too).126 Successfully holding the 
food companies legally accountable for the obesity epidemic could lead to 
many positive outcomes, but perhaps the most politically and socially 
enticing would be distributing the damages to states to recover healthcare 
funding. Rather than fork out individual payouts to individual plaintiffs, 
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the public might have an easier time supporting putting money back into 
government programs to provide for better healthcare. 
CONCLUSION 
CCAs should be repealed to make room for tobacco-like litigation 
that many experts expected to plague the food industry. As long as CCAs 
block the possibility of tort reform, food companies will continue to 
deceive consumers and Americans’ health will continue to decline. 
Because the companies that dominate the food industry have demonstrated 
their profit-driven agenda in providing products that are highly detrimental 
to the health of their consumers (a majority of Americans), they should be 
held accountable for their actions. Similar to the success of “Big Tobacco” 
litigation, tort reform has the potential to play a significant role in 
launching “Big Food” litigation. Although foreseeable legal and societal 
obstacles exist, the dire necessity of creating a healthier generation of 
Americans alone should, at the very least, move the conversation forward. 
